A new report authored by the US House Committee on Homeland Security and the Select Committee on Strategic Competition with China reveals just how vulnerable America’s critical port infrastructure has become. Almost 80% of the ship-to-shore cranes at U.S. ports are manufactured by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industry Co., Ltd. (ZPMC), a Chinese state-owned giant. As convenient as these cranes may be for loading and unloading cargo, they also carry the weight of alarming national security risks.
The investigation details the ways China has positioned itself as a dominant force in U.S. maritime operations. It turns out ZPMC cranes don’t just lift containers—they potentially lift critical U.S. data right into the hands of Chinese intelligence.
ZPMC’s Market Dominance: How China Controls U.S. Ports
One of the most alarming revelations from the report is just how reliant U.S. ports have become on Chinese-manufactured equipment. ZPMC, the world’s largest supplier of ship-to-shore (STS) cranes, produces nearly 80% of the cranes used in U.S. ports and controls about 70% of the global market. How did ZPMC secure this market dominance? The answer lies in its state-backed advantage. ZPMC benefits from heavily subsidized steel and access to cheap labor, allowing it to undercut competitors and offer cranes at non-competitive prices.
These cranes are essential for the U.S. maritime sector, facilitating commercial trade and even military logistics. However, this reliance on a Chinese state-owned entity for such critical infrastructure poses serious risks. In the event of geopolitical tensions—such as a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region—China could exploit its control over U.S. port equipment to disrupt operations, directly impacting both the U.S. economy and military readiness.
Cellular Modems: Ports’ Hidden Danger
One of the most troubling discoveries during the investigation was the presence of hidden cellular modems installed on ZPMC cranes. These modems, which bypass U.S. port firewalls, provide an obscure method for collecting data and could allow for unauthorized access to sensitive systems. In fact, a 2021 FBI investigation uncovered intelligence-gathering equipment installed on ZPMC cranes at the Port of Baltimore, further highlighting the real and present danger these devices pose.
While ZPMC has denied responsibility for these modems, the potential for them to disrupt U.S. port operations or be used for espionage is a significant concern. Technicians at U.S. ports were reportedly aware of the modems, initially believing they were intended for diagnostic purposes. However, it’s now clear that these devices may serve a much more nefarious purpose.
The Geopolitical Strategy Behind China’s Port Influence
China’s stake in U.S. ports is part of a broader strategy to control global supply chains. Through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) like China COSCO Shipping and China Merchants Group, China has invested billions in key U.S. ports, including Long Beach, Seattle, Los Angeles, Houston, and Miami. These investments are part of China’s larger geopolitical ambitions, aimed at gaining economic leverage over critical infrastructure worldwide.
The investigation raises concerns that in the event of a conflict—particularly regarding Taiwan—China could leverage its dominance in U.S. port equipment to manipulate or disrupt the flow of goods and military supplies. This threat extends beyond the United States, as China’s control over global ports has the potential to reshape international trade and geopolitical power dynamics.
ABB’s Role: Collaboration with ZPMC Raises Red Flags
Another critical aspect of the report involves ABB, a multinational corporation that has long-standing partnerships with ZPMC. ABB is responsible for producing critical crane control systems and components used in ZPMC cranes. Despite its claim of maintaining robust cybersecurity measures, ABB itself has been a victim of a ransomware attack, exposing sensitive data and raising concerns about its collaboration with Chinese firms.
ABB has contracts with multiple U.S. government agencies, including the Navy and NASA, which makes its partnership with ZPMC even more worrisome. The investigation found that ABB stores its components in China for up to 18 months, where ZPMC engineers handle the final assembly. This raises significant concerns about the integrity of these systems, as ZPMC may have access to proprietary information and the ability to insert vulnerabilities during the manufacturing process.
A Broader National Security Threat
The report doesn’t stop with ZPMC or ABB. It highlights that many global crane manufacturers, including German and Finnish companies, also have deep ties to China, further complicating the supply chain security for U.S. ports. Even though these companies are not directly owned by the Chinese government, their business dealings in China make them vulnerable to pressure from the Chinese state.
The geopolitical landscape is shifting, and China’s aggressive push to control strategic infrastructure around the world—including ports and their critical equipment—is a significant cause for concern. U.S. federal agencies, including the FBI and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), have already issued warnings about China’s influence in the maritime sector, but more concrete actions are needed to mitigate these threats.
Recommendations: Steps to Secure U.S. Ports
The report makes several key recommendations to mitigate the risks posed by Chinese-manufactured port equipment:
- Disconnect ZPMC cranes from cellular modems: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Coast Guard should issue immediate guidance to disconnect any ZPMC crane from cellular modems or similar communication devices, unless explicitly required by contract.
- Strengthen cybersecurity measures: DHS, through CISA and the Coast Guard, should prioritize closing cybersecurity gaps at U.S. ports and install operational technology monitoring software to detect any unauthorized access attempts.
- Diversify crane suppliers: Congress should pass legislation that allows U.S. ports to bypass “Buy America” requirements when purchasing STS cranes from non-adversarial countries. Encouraging the development of domestic crane manufacturers could also help reduce reliance on Chinese suppliers.
- Enhance cybersecurity at strategic ports: DHS and the Department of Defense (DoD) should collaborate to ensure that U.S. Commercial Strategic Seaports, especially those designated for military use, have robust cybersecurity defenses against foreign threats.
A Call for Action
At a time when global supply chains are already under strain, safeguarding the ports that support global commerce and national defense should be a top priority. The U.S. can no longer afford to ignore the vulnerabilities inherent in its reliance on Chinese-made port equipment. Whether it’s hidden cellular modems or state-subsidized crane dominance, the risks are too high to leave unchecked.
The future of U.S. port security will require a multi-faceted approach, blending short-term fixes with long-term strategies to reduce dependence on foreign-made equipment and bolster cybersecurity defenses. The stakes aren’t just about trade—they’re about national security.